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1. Introduction 
I formulate an account, in terms of essence and ground, that explains why atomic Russellian propositions 
have the truth conditions they do. The key ideas are that (i) atomic propositions are just 0-adic relations,1 (ii) 
truth is just the 1-adic version of the instantiation (or, as I will say, holding) relation (Menzel 1993: 86, note 27), 
and (iii) atomic propositions have the truth conditions they do for basically the same reasons that partially 
plugged relations, like being an x and a y such that Philip gave x to y, have the holding conditions they do.  
 The account is meant to be mainly of intrinsic interest, but I hope that it goes some distance toward 
answering an objection to classical theories of propositions put forward by King (2014), who writes that 
‘since the classical conception of propositions as things that have truth conditions by their very natures and 
independently of minds and languages is incapable of explaining how or why propositions have truth condi-
tions, it is unacceptable’ (2014: 47).2 Propositions do have their truth conditions ‘by their very natures’ and 
‘independently of minds and languages’. But a fact about a given entity can hold by the very nature of that 
entity without being a fundamental fact.  
 I argue that this is plausibly the case for atomic Russellian propositions and the facts about their truth 
conditions. A fact about the truth conditions of such a proposition holds by the very nature of the given 
proposition but is metaphysically grounded in facts about that proposition’s parts and their essences. If my 
account is correct, then the supposedly intractable problem of explaining why the given propositions have the 
truth conditions they do reduces to the problem of explaining why relations have the holding essences they 
do, which few seem to have found worrisome.3   
 A warning. Although I do argue for various components of the theory, the arguments will amount to 
nothing more than gentle nudges, and they will have almost no force on those who are not already attracted 
to views in the vicinity of the intended conclusion. I hope the paper does some interesting philosophical work 
anyway. Most of that work, such as it is, comes in the form of just stating a certain simple-minded theory, 
which I find plausible without argument. The theory has not, as far as I know, been set out explicitly before.  
 
2.   Ground, essence, and Russellian propositions 
I will help myself to the notions of constitutive essence (Fine 1995a, b) and metaphysical ground (Rosen 
2010; Fine 2012). I assume that if it is essential to a thing α that so-and-so, then it is metaphysically necessary 
that so-and-so, and the fact that is metaphysically necessary that so-and-so is fully grounded in the fact that is 
essential to α that so-and-so (Rosen 2010: 119, note 11). 4  More formally, I assume that every instance of the 
following schema is true:  
                                                 
1 This view is discussed by Quine (1960: 165) and endorsed by Bealer (1982), Zalta (1988), Menzel (1993), and van In-
wagen (2004). 
2 See Speaks (2014: 147-151) for a related objection. 
3 Thanks to David Sanson for this way of putting it. 
4 I also follow Rosen (2010) in four other ways. (i) My official ideology for ground consists of a primitive predicate ‘x is 
fully grounded by yy’, symbolized ‘x←yy’. (ii) I take this grounding predicate to express a transitive and asymmetric rela-
tion that holds only between facts – specifically, between an individual fact x, which gets grounded, and some (‘a plurali-
ty of’) facts yy, which collectively do the grounding. I offer a formal statement of the relevant transitivity principle in 
section 11. (iii) I use square brackets to form names of facts: e.g., ‘the fact that grass is green’ gets abbreviated as ‘[grass 
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The Essence Grounds Necessity Schema 
If ⃞xxφ then [⃞φ] ← [⃞xxφ] 
If it’s essential to xx that φ, then the fact that it’s necessary that φ is fully grounded in the fact that it’s essential to xx 
that φ. 
Assume that it’s essential to s that Socrates is a member of s. Then the above schema lets us conclude that the 
fact that it’s necessary that Socrates is a member of s is fully grounded in the fact that it’s essential to s that 
Socrates is a member of s. 
 Now for a quick sketch of a view about atomic Russellian propositions. Some of it may be dispensa-
ble in what follows, but it will probably be helpful to proceed with a specific theory in mind. An atomic Rus-
sellian proposition is an abstract (non-spatiotemporal) entity composed of the objects that the proposition is 
about together with the relation that it predicates of them. For example, the proposition that Philip gave Bu-
cephalus to Alexander – call it p0 – is composed of these four things: Philip, Bucephalus, Alexander, and the 
gave relation.5 To say that a thing x is composed of things yy is to say that each of yy is a part of x and each 
part of x overlaps (shares a part with) at least one of yy. So, on my view, p0 has each of those four things as 
parts (in the same sense of ‘part’ as that in which a certain rock is a part of Mt. Etna), and they exhaust the p0, 
in the sense that p0 does not have any additional parts that don’t overlap any of those four things.  
 A Tinkertoy sculpture is composed of some Tinkertoys that are stuck together. It is not composed of 
those Tinkertoys and the relation being stuck together. That relation is not a part of the sculpture. Perhaps it is 
essential to that sculpture that it is composed of things that stand in the being stuck together relation; even so, 
the relation is not a part of the sculpture. Similarly, there may be some relation R that does not overlap the 
gave relation, Philip, Bucephalus, or Alexander but that is somehow involved in the essence of p0; perhaps it is 
essential to p0 that the gave relation bears R to Philip, Bucephalus, and Alexander in that order. Even so, no 
such relation R is a part of p0, pace Caplan, Tillman, and Nutting (this volume). Just as hylomorphism about 
Tinkertoy sculptures is false (van Inwagen 2014), so is hylomorphism about propositions. That, anyway, is the 
picture that I will be working with in what follows.  
                                                                                                                                                             
is green]’. (iv) My official ideology for essence consists of an undefined operator, ‘it is essential to xx that φ’, i.e., ‘⃞xxφ’, 
that expresses the notion of constitutive essence (Fine 1995a, b). I assume that constitutive essence is fundamental, ra-
ther than being defined, e.g., in terms of consequential essence and ground, as it is in Fine (2012) and Rosen (2015). For 
reasons to reject such definitions, see Livingstone-Banks (2017) and Nutting, Caplan, and Tillman (2018). 
5 This is a simplification. My official account of the mereological structure of p0 is framed in terms of a four-place, loca-
tion-relative parthood relation, expressed by ‘x at its location y is a part of z at its location w’. For example, a certain rock, 
at its spacetime location r1 (but perhaps not at another of its spacetime locations, r1*) is a part of a certain volcano, at its 
spacetime location r2 (but perhaps not at another of its spacetime locations, r2*). As this relation applies to propositions, 
the locations in questions are slots in the entities expressed by, e.g., predicates and sentential connectives. Some slots, e.g., 
those in the meanings of connectives, are predicative, and others, e.g., those in the gave relation, are objectual; no slot is both 
objectual and predicative. This allows us to say: (i) p0 occupies at least one predicative slot, and for any predicative slot s 
that p0 occupies, there are three different objectual slots s1, s2, and s3, such that s1 is the first slot in the gave relation at s, s2 
is the second slot in gave at s, and s3 is the third slot in gave at s, and Philip at s1 is a part of p0 at s, and Bucephalus at s2 is 
a part of p0 at s, and Alexander at s3 is a part of p0 at s, and gave at s is a part of p0 at s, and for any x and y, if x at y is a 
part of p0 at s, then either x at y overlaps Philip at s1 or x at y overlaps Bucephalus at s2 or x at y overlaps Alexander at s3 
or x at y overlaps gave at s, and (ii) p0 occupies at least one objectual slot, and for any objectual slot s that p0 occupies, p0 
is simple at s, i.e., for any x and any y, if x at y is a part of p0 at s, then x=p0 and y=s. (To say that x at y overlaps z at w is 
to say that for some u and u*, u at u* is a part of x at y and u at u* is a part of z at w.  ) In short, a given atomic proposi-
tion is complex at predicative slots and simple at objectual slots; at a given predicative slot, the proposition p0 has, as 
parts, Philip at the first slot in gave, Bucephalus at the second slot in gave, Alexander at the third slot in gave, and gave itself 
at the predicative slot in question, and no other parts disjoint from all of those. For independent developments of the 
proposal that parthood is four-place, see Gilmore (2009) and Kleinschmidt (2011), who ends up arguing against the pro-
posal. For the application to propositions, see Gilmore (2014). 
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3. Truth 
Propositions have truth conditions. Let’s say that a sentence s correctly specifies the truth conditions of a proposi-
tion p if and only if (i) s is a true instance of the following schema 
 TS ⃞( __ is true if and only if . . . ), 
and (ii) s results from putting a term that rigidly designates p in the first blank in TS. Let ‘Bob’ be a rigid, di-
rectly referential proper name for the proposition that grass is green. Then both of the following sentences 
are true and correctly specify Bob’s truth conditions: 
 T1 ⃞(Bob is true if and only if grass is green) 
 T2 ⃞(Bob is true if and only if (grass is green and 2 is prime)). 
In addition to truth conditions, propositions have something more fine-grained, which I will call truth essences.6 
I will say that a sentence s correctly specifies the truth essence of a proposition p if and only if (i) s is a true 
instance of the following schema: 
 ES ⃞ ___ (*** is true if and only if . . . ), 
and (ii) s results from putting terms that rigidly designate p in the ‘___’ and ‘***’ blanks. For example, it is 
plausible that E1, the essentialist counterpart of T1, correctly specifies Bob’s truth essence: 
 E1 ⃞Bob (Bob is true if and only if grass is green) 
E1 says that it is essential to Bob – it is ‘part of what it is to be Bob’ – that Bob is true if and only if grass is 
green. That is plausible.7 By contrast, the essentialist counterpart of T2 is not plausible:  
 E2 ⃞Bob (Bob is true if and only if (grass is green and 2 is prime)) 
E2 says that it is essential to Bob that Bob is true if and only if (grass is green and 2 is prime). Granted, it is 
metaphysically necessary that Bob is true iff (grass is green and 2 is prime). But it is not essential to Bob – not 
part of what it is to be Bob – that Bob is true iff (grass is green and 2 is prime). 
 It is worth noting that we now have the resources to give a perfectly correct, if not very satisfying or 
informative, explanation of a fact about Bob’s truth conditions. The explanandum is 
 f1 [⃞(Bob is true if and only if grass is green)]. 
                                                 
6This way of putting it, which appears to reify entities called truth conditions and truth essences, is loose shorthand for talk 
about instances of TS and ES.   
7 As noted by Pautz (2016: 481). One might grant T1 and grant that it is essential to Bob that greenness is a part or con-
stituent of Bob while denying E1, on the grounds that truth and truth conditions are not sufficiently internal to Bob. 
(Thanks to Jack Spencer for raising this worry.) One option would be to retreat to the view, call it E1*, that ⃞Bob, truth 
(Bob is true iff grass is green), i.e., that it is essential to Bob and truth collectively that Bob is true iff grass is green. But 
in my view no such retreat is needed. I find E1 at least as plausible as the claim that it is essential to {Socrates} individu-
ally, not merely to {Socrates} and membership collectively, that Socrates is a member of {Socrates}. A parallel worry 
applies to all the other essentialist claims I make throughout the paper, including, e.g., the claim that it is essential to g3, 
the relation expressed by ‘gave’, that it holds of x, y, and z in that order iff x gave y to z. In each case I offer a parallel 
reply. However, even if I were to retreat to E1* and its ilk, I could still do most of what I want to do in the paper. As I 
explain later, what I call the Explanatory Argument will need to be modified slightly.  
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As a reminder, square brackets are used so that an expression like ‘[snow is white]’ abbreviates ‘the fact that 
snow is white’. It is syntactically a term, not a sentence. f1, which is a ‘merely modal’ fact about Bob, is fully 
grounded in 
 f2 [⃞Bob (Bob is true if and only if grass is green)], 
which is an essence fact about Bob. That f1 is fully grounded in f2, i.e., that f1 ← f2, follows from E1 togeth-
er with the relevant instance of the Essence Grounds Necessity Schema. Why is it metaphysically necessary 
that Bob is true iff grass is green? Because it is essential to Bob that Bob is true iff grass is green.   
    Before we get to the more interesting part of the account, in which we specify the grounds of facts 
like f2, I want to pause to consolidate and generalize on the points we have made so far. First, I want to try to 
capture a generalization in the vicinity of E1. E1 is about Bob in particular. It says that it is essential to Bob 
that Bob is true iff grass is green. But presumably something similar holds for every proposition. Can this 
thought be made explicit and fully general? If one allows quantification into sentence position, one can write: 
 TEQ ∀x if x is a proposition then (∃S x=<S> & ⃞x(x is true iff S)), 
where angle brackets are used to form singular terms that denote propositions. (‘<S>’ abbreviates ‘the propo-
sition that S’.) Without quantification into sentence position, one might need to rest content with the claim 
that every instance of the following schema is true: 
 TES    ∀x if x=<φ> then ⃞x(x is true iff φ), 
where an instance of TES is formed by substituting some English sentence in for ‘φ’. This is less than fully 
general, since that it says nothing about propositions that are not expressed by any English sentence.  
 Second, I want to try to capture a generalization in the vicinity of the claim that f1 ← f2. Allowing 
ourselves quantification into sentence position, we could write 
 EGQ ∀x if x is a proposition then ∃S (x=<S> & [⃞(x is true iff S)] ← [⃞x (x is true iff S)]).8 
A corresponding schema might be: 
 EGS ∀x if x=<φ> then [⃞(x is true iff φ)] ← [⃞x(x is true iff φ)]. 
EGS follows from TES together with the Essence Grounds Necessity Schema.   
 
4. Holding 
Just as propositions have truth conditions, properties and relations have instantiation conditions – or, as I will 
say, holding conditions. Let’s say that a sentence s correctly specifies the holding conditions of a property p if 
and only if (i) s is a true instance of   
                                                 
8 However, the desire to avoid quantifying into sentence position is one main motivation for expressing full ground with 
a predicate, ‘←’, rather than a sentential connective, ‘because’. If we allow ourselves quantification into sentence posi-
tion, it seems that can capture the idea behind EGQ more directly as 
EGQ*  ∀x(if x is a proposition then: ∃S(x=<S> & ((⃞(x is true iff S)) because (⃞x(x is true iff S))))), 
which avoids the detour through facts. 
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 HCS ⃞∀x( __ holds of x if and only if . . . ), 
and (ii) s results from putting a term that rigidly designates p in the first blank in HCS. For example, let ‘Mary’ 
be a rigid, directly referential name for the property being human. Then both of the following sentences are true 
and correctly specify Mary’s holding conditions: 
 HC1 ⃞∀x (Mary holds of x if and only if x is human) 
HC2 ⃞∀x (Mary holds of x if and only if (x is human and 2 is prime)) 
And as with propositions, properties and relations also have something more fine-grained, which I will call 
holding essences. I will say that a sentence s correctly specifies the holding essence of a property p if and only if: 
(i) s is a true instance of 
 HES ⃞ 
___
∀x (*** holds of x if and only if . . . ),  
and (ii) s results from putting terms that rigidly designate p in the ‘___’ and ‘***’ blanks. It is plausible that 
HE1, the essentialist counterpart of HC1, correctly specifies the holding essence of Mary: 
 HE1 ⃞Mary∀x (Mary holds of x if and only if x is human)     
HE1 says that it is essential to Mary that Mary holds of an entity if and only if that entity is human. This is 
plausible (as noted by Gilmore 2013: 209-210 and Pautz 2016: 481).9 By contrast, the essentialist counterpart 
of HC2 is not plausible: 
 HE2 ⃞Mary∀x(Mary holds of x if and only if (x is human and 2 is prime)). 
It is metaphysically necessary, but not essential to Mary, that Mary holds of a given entity if and only if: that 
entity is human and 2 is prime.  
 It is tempting, but incorrect, to read HE1 as saying that it is essential to Mary that Mary holds of an 
entity if and only if Mary holds of that entity.10 My view is that ‘Obama is human’ and ‘Mary holds of Obama’ 
express different propositions, on the grounds that (i) holding is a part of the latter proposition but not of the 
former, (ii) Mary (being human) is a predicative part of the former but not of the latter, and (iii) Mary is an ob-
jectual part of the latter but not of the former.11 For parallel reasons, I say that ‘∀x (Mary holds of x if and 
only if x is human)’ and ‘∀x (Mary holds of x if and only if Mary holds of x)’ express different propositions. 
HE1 is true if and only if the former proposition belongs to Mary’s constitutive essence. (I assume that a 
                                                 
9 Several nearby claims are also plausible: (a) if Bob is true, then the fact that Bob is true is grounded in the fact that 
grass is green; (b) if Mary holds of a thing, then the fact that Mary holds of it is grounded in the fact that it is human; (c) 
it is essential to Bob that if Bob is true, then the fact that Bob is true is grounded in the fact that grass is green; (d) it is 
essential to Mary that if Mary holds of a thing, then the fact that Mary holds of it is grounded in the fact that it is human. 
For a defense of claims like (b), and further elaboration of analogies between properties, relations, and propositions, see 
Dixon (2017). Those who accept both HE1 and (d) will be committed to some redundancy in Mary’s constitutive es-
sence. (Thanks to Jeff Russell for this point.) Pautz (2016) also mentions claims like (c) and (d).  
10 Analogously, it would be wrong to read E1 as saying either (i) that it is essential to Bob that Bob is true if and only if 
Bob is true or (ii) that it is essential to Bob that Bob is true if and only if greenness holds of grass. (‘Grass is green’ and 
‘greenness holds of grass’ express different propositions.)       
11 To say that x is a predicative (alternatively: objectual) part of y is to say that for some slots s and s*, s is a predicative 
(alternatively: objectual) slot and x at s is a part of y at s*. See note 5. 
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thing’s constitutive essence is a set of propositions.) HE1 is silent as to whether the latter proposition belongs 
to Mary’s constitutive essence.   
 To extend the parallel between propositions and properties a bit farther, we can point out that, just 
as f1 is fully grounded in f2, HE1 and the relevant instance of the Essence Grounds Necessity Schema to-
gether entail that  
 f3 [⃞∀x(Mary holds of x if and only if x is human)] 
is fully grounded in 
 f4 [⃞Mary∀x(Mary holds of x if and only if x is human)]. 
Why is it metaphysically necessary that Mary holds of all and only those things that are human? Because it is 
essential to Mary that Mary holds of all and only those things that are human. Presumably something similar 
is true of all properties. As in the case of propositions, however, it is not clear how to capture this generaliza-
tion explicitly.  
 What goes for properties goes for relations. Better, what goes for 1-adic relations also goes for rela-
tions whose adicity is 2 or greater. They all have holding conditions, which are relatively coarse-grained, and 
holding essences, which are more fine-grained. I leave it to the reader to write out some examples.  
 To flesh out the analogies more explicitly and generally, I will introduce a series of primitive predi-
cates of the form ‘HOLDn’, where n (for now greater than or equal to 2) specifies the adicity of the predicate. 
Thus we have ‘HOLD2’, which is a 2-adic predicate, ‘HOLD3’, which is a 3-adic predicate, and so on. Infor-
mally, ‘HOLD2(x, y)’ means that x is instantiated by (holds of) y; ‘HOLD3(x, y, z)’ means that x is instantiated 
by y and z in that order; ‘HOLD4(x, y, z, w)’ means that x is instantiated by y, z, and w in that order; and so on. 
It might be that each of these predicates expresses a different holding relation, each with a fixed adicity. Al-
ternatively, it might be that each of these predicates expresses the same variably polyadic relation or the same 
dyadic relation with a second slot that is plural and order-sensitive. (Thanks to David Liebesman for pointing 
out this third option.) I take no stand. 
 I will also use a variable-binding lambda operator, ‘Λx1 . . . xn’ that abbreviates ‘being an x1 . . . and 
an xn such that’. This operator attaches to a well-formed formula and yields an expression that is syntactically 
a term, not a predicate (Fine 2012: 67-71). (Menzel (1993) develops a language in which these expressions can 
occupy either term position or predicate position.) For example, ‘Λxyz x gave y to z’ is a singular term that 
denotes a certain 3-adic relation: being an x, a y, and a z such that x gave y to z.  
 Equipped with these expressions, we can generalize. Properties and relations – hereafter, just ‘rela-
tions’ – have holding essences, which can be specified schematically as follows: 
 GES ∀u if u=Λx1 . . . xn (φ x1 . . . xn) then  
     ⃞u∀x1 . . . ∀xn(HOLDn+1(u, x1, . . ., xn) if and only if φ x1 . . . xn)   
In words: if u is the n-adic relation being an x1 . . . and an xn such that so-and-so, then it is essential to u that, for 
any x1,  . . ., and any xn, u holds of x1, . . ., and xn in that order if and only if so-and-so. Together, GES and 
the Essence Grounds Necessity Schema entail 
 GGS  ∀u if u = Λx1 . . . xn(φ x1 . . . xn) then  
    [⃞∀x1 . . . ∀xn(HOLDn+1(u, x1, . . ., xn) if and only if φ x1 . . . xn)] ←  
    [⃞u∀x1 . . . ∀xn (HOLDn+1(u, x1, . . ., xn) if and only if φ x1 . . . xn)] 
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In words: if u is the n-adic relation being an x1 . . . and an xn such that so-and-so, then the fact that it is metaphysi-
cally necessary that, for any x1,  . . ., and any xn, u holds of x1, . . ., and xn in that order if and only if so-and-so 
is fully grounded by the fact that it is essential to u that, for any x1,  . . ., and any xn, u holds of x1, . . ., and xn 
in that order if and only if so-and-so.  
 
5. Plugging 
An n-adic relation, I assume, has exactly n slots in it, and when n is greater than or equal to 1, these slots are 
ordered: there is a unique 1st slot in it, . . ., and a unique nth slot in it.12 Being an x and a y such that x loves y is a 2-
adic relation, so it has exactly two slots in it, a first slot and a second slot.13 Further, I assume that the slots in 
a relation can be plugged by things to form a ‘partially plugged’ relation of a lesser adicity than the original 
relation. The first slot in the 2-adic relation being an x and a y such that x loves y can be plugged by Barack to 
form the 1-adic relation being a y such that Barack loves y. Similarly, the second slot in the original 2-adic relation 
can be plugged with Barack to form the 1-adic relation being an x such that x loves Barack. 
 I will focus on a certain 3-adic plugging relation, which I will express with the predicate, ‘PLUG1’. (I 
adapt the terminology of Zalta (1988), who uses ‘plug1’ as a function symbol.) Roughly, ‘PLUG1(x, y, z)’ 
means that plugging the first slot in the relation x with y results in z, in which case x is an n-adic relation, z is 
an (n-1)-adic relation, n is greater than or equal to 1, and y might be anything whatsoever. A bit less roughly, 
‘PLUG1(x, y, z)’ means that there is a slot s, which is the first slot in x, and y occupies s, and y, at s, combines 
with x to compose z.14 Here is an example:  
If g3=Λxyz(x gave y to z) and g2=Λyz(Philip gave y to z), then PLUG1(g3, Philip, g2).  
This says that if g3 is the relation being an x, a y, and a z such that x gave y to z, and if g2 is the relation being a y 
and a z such that the Philip gave y to z, then plugging the first slot in g3 with Philip results in g2.  See Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 See Gilmore (2013) for a case for the existence of slots and for references to many other realists about slots. That slots 
are ordered within a relation is presupposed by Zalta (1988), Menzel (1993: 69), Swoyer (1998: 307), and Gilmore (2014: 
191).    
13 Officially, if a relation R is n-adic, then R occupies at least one predicative slot, and for any predicative slot s that R 
occupies, R has exactly n slots at s, where this allows that (i) R occupies objectual slots but R has no slots in it at those 
objectual slots and (ii) each of the n slots that R has at s is numerically distinct from any of the n slots that R has at any 
of the other predicative slots that R occupies. By analogy: a lump of dough might have a hole in it at t1 when it is donut-
shaped, have no holes at t2 when it is ball-shaped, and have a numerically distinct hole at t3 when it is donut-shaped 
again. See note 5 and Gilmore (2014).   
14 Officially, to say that PLUG1(x, y, z) is to say that x occupies at least one predicative slot, and for any predicative slot s 
that x occupies, there is an s* such that: (i) s* is the 1st slot in x at s, (ii) y at s* is a part of z at s, (iii) x at s is a part of z at 
s, and (iv) for any w and w*, if w at w* is a part of z at s, then w at w* overlaps y at s* or w at w* overlaps x at s. See note 5. 
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6. Grounding the facts about the holding essences of partially plugged relations 
Partially plugged relations have holding conditions and holding essences. Let g3 be Λxyz(x gave y to z), and 
let g2 be Λyz(Philip gave y to z). Now consider the following fact about the holding essence of g2: 
 f5 [⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD3(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2)] 
What, if anything, grounds f5? Why does g2 have that holding essence? Two facts seem relevant. The first is 
the fact that the 3-adic, fully unsaturated relation g3 has the holding essence that it does. This fact is 
 f6 [⃞g3∀x1∀x2∀x3(HOLD4(g3, x1, x2, x3) if and only if x1 gave x2 to x3)]. 
The second is the fact that g2 is related to g3 in a certain way: g2 is what results from plugging Philip into the 
first slot in g3. Plugging the first slot in g3 with Philip results in g2. This second fact is 
 f7 [PLUG1(g3, Philip, g2)] 
These two facts, f6 and f7, seem to be enough to fully ground f5. In symbols: 
 GP1 f5 ← f6, f7. 
The partially plugged relation g2 has the holding essence it has because: (i) it results from plugging the first 
slot of g3 with Philip, and (ii) the ‘simpler’, completely unsaturated relation g3 has the holding essence it has. 
Consider another example. Let g1 be the 1-adic relation Λx(Philip gave Bucephalus to x). See Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here is a fact about the holding essence of g1: 
gave to g3 
gave to g2 
Figure 1 
gave to g1 
Figure 2 
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 f8 [⃞g1∀x1(HOLD2(g1, x1) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to x1)] 
What grounds f8? It is plausible that f8 is grounded in f5, together with  
 f9 [PLUG1(g2, Bucephalus, g1)]. 
That is, it is plausible that 
 GP2 f8 ← f5, f9. 
The bottom two arrows in Figure 4 represent GP1 and GP2.  
 
7. 0-adic relations exist 
My claims so far have been about relations whose adicity is 1 or greater. I will now use these claims as prem-
ises in a series of inductive arguments for conclusions about 0-adic relations. The first argument is meant to 
motivate the view that there are 0-adic relations.  
  
The Inductive Existence Argument 
1. (a) Λxyz(x gave y to z) exists and is a 3-adic relation; (b) Philip exists and is a material object15; and (c) 
 there is a w such that (i) w=Λyz(Philip gave y to z), (ii) w is a 2-adic relation, and (iii) PLUG1(Λxyz(x 
 gave y to z), Philip, w).                          Fa & Ga 
2. (a) Λyz(Philip gave y to z) exists and is a 2-adic relation; (b) Bucephalus exists and is a material object; 
 and (c) there is a w such that (i) w=Λz(Philip gave Bucephalus to z), (ii) w is a 1-adic relation, and (iii) 
 PLUG1(Λyz(Philip gave y to z), Bucephalus, w).     Fb & Gb 
3. (a) Λz(Philip gave Bucephalus to z) exists and is a 1-adic relation; (b) Alexander exists and is a 
 material object.                    Fc 
- - - - - - - - - - - Singular Predictive Inference- - - - - - - - - - - -  
4. So, (c) there is a w such that (i) w=Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander), (ii) w is a  
 0-adic relation, and (iii) PLUG1(Λz(Philip gave Bucephalus to z), Alexander, w).     Gc 
In a nutshell, the argument is this. The relation g3 has three slots. You can plug the first slot in g3 to get a 
new relation, g2, which has only two slots; you can plug the first slot in g2 to get a new relation, g1, which has 
only one slot; so, by enumerative induction, you should be able to plug the first and only slot in g1 to get yet 
another relation, which will have no slots. Let g0 be a rigid, directly referential name for this 0-adic relation, 
Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander).16 See Figure 3. 
                                                 
15 In light of the Russell-Myhill paradox (on which see Appendix B of Russell (1903), Myhill (1958)), I hesitate to say that 
for just any n-adic (n>0) relation R and for just any entity x whatsoever, there will always be some entity y that results 
from plugging the first slot in R with x. But given that g3 is an ordinary relation and given that Philip is a material object, 
it is hard to see why there wouldn’t be an entity that results from plugging the Philip into the first slot in g3. I hope that 
my account harmonizes with some natural solution to the Russell-Myhill paradox and other paradoxes about proposi-
tions (on which see Deutsch (this volume)), but I cannot do justice to this issue here.       
16It is tempting to translate the lambda expression ‘Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)’ into philosopher’s English 
as ‘being such that Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander’. (Thanks to Noël Saenz and Eileen Nutting for pointing this 
out.) But I can’t allow that translation, since the latter expression denotes a 1-adic relation, being an x such that Philip gave 
Bucephalus to Alexander (=Λx(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)). My reply is just to deny that I am under any obliga-
tion to find a translation of the given lambda expression into philosopher’s English. 
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 If the argument seems weak in that it is an induction from only two cases, we can revise it by using a 
different example. Instead of starting with a 3-adic relation, we can start with a googolplex-adic relation, and 
gradually work our way toward relations of lesser adicity by plugging slots, one by one. This will increase our 
sample size but leave the argument otherwise unchanged. If the revised argument is too weak, it will not be 
due to an overly small sample size.   
 
8. Facts about the holding essences of 0-adic relations are grounded in the familiar way  
Now for a second inductive argument. To state it, I will need a 1-adic holding predicate, ‘HOLD1’, in addition 
to those already on the table. I assume that if one grasps the meanings of our older ‘HOLDn’ predicates, and 
if one extrapolates in the natural way from those cases, one can grasp the meaning of ‘HOLD1’ as well. Just as 
‘HOLD3(x, y, z)’ means that x holds of y and z in that order, and ‘HOLD2(x, y)’ means that x holds of y, 
‘HOLD1(x)’ means that x just plain holds, i.e., that x holds simpliciter. ‘HOLD1’ is to ‘HOLD2’ what ‘HOLD2’ is 
to  ‘HOLD3’ and what ‘HOLD3’ is to ‘HOLD4’. And so on.  
 With all this in hand, we are in a position to set out a second inductive argument. It is meant to mo-
tivate the view that the 0-adic relation g0 has a certain holding essence, and the fact that it has this holding 
essence is grounded in the fact that g1 has the holding essence it has, together with the fact that plugging the 
first slot in g1 with Alexander results in g0.  
 The Inductive Grounding Argument 
1. g3=Λx1x2x3(x1 gave x2 to x3) & ⃞g3∀x1∀x2∀x3(HOLD4(g3, x1, x2, x3) if and only if x1 gave x2 to x3) 
 & PLUG1(g3, Philip, g2) & g2=Λx1x2(Philip gave x1 to x2) &   
  ⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD3(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2) & 
  [⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD3(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2)] ← 
   [⃞g3∀x1∀x2∀x3(HOLD4(g3, x1, x2, x3) if and only if x1 gave x2 to x3)],  
   [PLUG1(g3, Philip, g2)]      Fa & Ga 
2.  g2=Λx1x2(Philip gave x1 to x2) & ⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD3(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2) & 
 PLUG1(g2, Bucephalus, g1) and g1=Λx1(Philip gave Bucephalus to x1) & ⃞g1∀x1(HOLD2(g1, x1) if 
 and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to x1)  & [⃞g1∀x1(HOLD2(g1, x1) if and only if Philip gave  
 Bucephalus to x1)] ← 
  [⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD3(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2)], 
gave to g0 
Figure 3 
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  [ PLUG1(g2, Bucephalus, g1)]      Fb & Gb 
3.  g1=Λx1(Philip gave Bucephalus to x1) & ⃞g1∀x1(HOLD2(g1, x1) if and only if Philip gave Bucephlus 
 to x1) & PLUG1(g1, Alexander, g0) and g0=Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander) Fc 
- - - - - - - - - - - Singular Predictive Inference- - - - - - - - - - - -  
4.  So, ⃞g0∀x1(HOLD1(g0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander) &  
 [⃞g0∀x1(HOLD1(g0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)] ←  
  [⃞g1∀x1(HOLD2(g1, x1) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to x1)],  
  [PLUG1(g1, Alexander, g0)]       Gc 
In a nutshell: (i) g2 results from plugging the first slot in g3 with Philip, g2 has a certain holding essence, and 
g2 has this holding essence because it results from plugging the first slot in g3 with Philip and g3 has the 
holding essence it has; (ii) g1 results from plugging the first slot in g2 with Bucephalus, g1 has a certain hold-
ing essence, and g1 has this holding essence because it results from plugging the first lot in g2 with Bucepha-
lus and g2 has the holding essence it has; (iii) g0 results from plugging the first slot in g1 with Alexander; so, 
by induction, g0 should have a certain holding essence, and it should have that holding essence because it 
results from plugging the first slot in g1 with Alexander and g1 has the holding essence it has. (As with the 
previous argument, the sample size can be increased by choosing a different example.) 
 If we let f10 be [⃞g0(HOLD1(g0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)] and f11 be 
[PLUG1(g1, Alexander, g0)], then the conclusion of the Inductive Grounding Argument entails that 
 GP3 f10 ← f11, f8, 
which can be added to GP1 and GP2. This is a convenient place to try to capture a generalization underlying 
GP1, GP2, and GP3. In schematic form: 
 The Hold-Plug Schema 
 ∀u∀u*∀y if ((u=Λx1 . . . xn(φ x1, . . ., xn) & PLUG1(u, y, u*)) then  
[⃞u*∀x1 . . .∀xn-1(HOLDn(u*, x1, . . ., xn-1) if and only if φ y, x1, . . ., xn-1)] ←  
[⃞u∀x1 . . . ∀xn(HOLDn+1(u, x1, . . ., xn) if and only if φ x1, . . ., xn)], [PLUG1(u, y, u*)] 
 where what goes in for ‘n’ must be a term for a number greater than or equal to 1. 
In words, the Hold-Plug Schema says that if u is the relation being some x1 . . . and some xn (for n>0) such that φ x1, 
. . ., xn and if plugging the first slot in u with y results in u*, then  
 the fact that it’s essential to u* that it holds of x1, . . ., xn-1 in that order if and only if φ y, x1, . . ., xn-1  
is fully grounded in these two facts, collectively: (i) the fact that it’s essential to u that it holds of x1, . . ., xn in 
that order if and only if φ x1,  . . . , xn, and (ii) the fact that plugging the first slot in u with y results in u*. In 
short, if u has an adicity of 1 or greater, and if plugging the first slot in u with y results in u*, then the fact that 
u* has the holding essence that it has is fully grounded in the fact that u has the holding essence that it has, 
together with the fact that plugging the first slot in u with y results in u*.  
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9. 0-adic relations are propositions 
So far I have argued that a certain 0-adic relation exists (Inductive Existence Argument) and that a certain fact 
about its holding essence is grounded in the same way as are the facts about the holding essences of relations 
of greater adicity (Inductive Grounding Argument).  
 Now I will argue that the given 0-adic relation, Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander), is a proposi-
tion. It is <Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander>. Some philosophers (Bealer (1982), Zalta (1988), Menzel 
(1993), van Inwagen (2004)) already accept the conclusion. I find it plausible on its face. But for those who 
are on the fence, here is an argument (adapted with slight modifications from Dixon and Gilmore (2016), 
where it is called the plugging argument). 
 Sentences express propositions relative to contexts. Mutatis mutandis for predicates and relations. If 
we abbreviate ‘expresses, relative the present context’ as just ‘expresses’, then we can argue as follows.   
The Inductive Expressing Argument 
1. ‘_____ gave ********** to . . . . . . . . . . .’ expresses Λxyz(x gave y to z), which is a 3-adic relation. 
2. ‘Philip gave ********** to . . . . . . . . . . .’ expresses Λyz(Philip gave y to z), which is a 2-adic relation. 
3. ‘Philip gave Bucephalus to . . . . . . . . . .’ expresses Λz(Philip gave Bucephalus to z), which is a 1-adic 
 relation. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Singular Predictive Inference- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
4. So, ‘Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander’ expresses Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander), which 
 is a 0-adic relation. 
5.  But ‘Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander’ expresses <Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander>, which 
 is a proposition. 
6.  ‘Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander’ expresses at most one thing. 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   Deductive Inference - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
7. So, Λ(Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)=<Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander>.  
It follows from 4, 5, and 7 that at least some 0-adic relations are propositions. Considerations of uniformity 
then generate pressure toward the view that all 0-adic relations are propositions. 
 
10. Holding1 is truth 
Let us stipulate that p0 is a rigid, directly referential proper name for <Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander>.  
If what I have said so far is correct, then we can draw two additional conclusions about p0 and g0. First, since 
g0 has a certain holding essence and the facts about its holding essence are grounded in certain other facts, 
and since p0 is identical to g0, it follows that p0 has that same holding essence and that the facts about its 
holding essence are grounded in those same other facts. Second, since p0 has a certain truth essence, and since 
p0 just is g0, it follows that g0 has that same truth essence.    
 But it does not follow that the facts about the truth essence of p0 just are the facts about the holding 
essence of g0. In particular, it does not follow that 
 f12 [⃞p0(TRUE(p0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)] 
is identical to 
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 f10 [⃞g0(HOLD1(g0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)] 
Nothing that I have said so far guarantees that f12=f10. But I want to argue that these facts really are identi-
cal, and hence that the grounds of f12 are the grounds of f10.  
 I am not going to appeal to any principle that supplies informative ‘identity conditions’ for facts in 
general. What I will appeal to instead is a more specific, and I hope more secure, claim about f12 and f10 in 
particular: 
 ID if ‘g0’ and ‘p0’ are directly referential names, then f10=f12 if and only if: (i) ‘g0’ and ‘p0’  
  refer to the same thing and (ii) ‘HOLD1’ and ‘TRUE’ express the same thing.   
We know that ‘g0’ and ‘p0’ are directly referential names, and we have argued that they do refer to the same 
thing. All that remains is to argue that ‘HOLD1’ and ‘TRUE’ express the same thing. Some find this claim 
independently plausible. Menzel, e.g., writes that ‘the 1-place exemplification predicate ‘△1’, of course, is the 
truth predicate’ (1993: 86, note 27). I agree with Menzel. But, for doubters, I offer two arguments. 
 The first is an inference to the best explanation of certain equivalences that hold between truth and 
holding1.  
The Explanatory Argument 
1. Truth and holding1 are necessarily equivalent: ⃞∀x(HOLD1(x) if and only if TRUE(x)). 
2. Necessarily, everything that has either a truth essence or a holding1 essence has both a truth essence  
 and a holding1 essence, and these essences mirror each other precisely, in the following sense: every  
 instance of schema M is true. 
  M ⃞∀x(⃞x(TRUE(x) if and only if φ) if and only if ⃞x(HOLD1(x) if and only if φ))17 
3. 1 and 2 are explained by the hypothesis that truth, which is expressed by ‘TRUE’, just is   
 holding1, which is expressed by ‘HOLD1’. 
4. No other hypothesis explains 1 and 2 as well. 
- - - - - - - - - -  Abductive Inference - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
5. Truth, which is expressed by ‘TRUE’, just is holding1, which is expressed by ‘HOLD1’. 
I assume that this needs no further comment.  
 A second argument for basically the same conclusion rests on some observations about three families 
of predicates: the ‘holds of’ family, the ‘is instantiated by’ family, and the ‘is true of’ family. The first 
observation is that ‘x holds of y’ says the same thing as ‘x is instantiated by y’, and ‘x holds of y and z in that 
order’ says the same thing as ‘x is instantiated by y and z in that order’, and so on. A second observation is 
that ‘x instantiated by y’ says the same thing as ‘x is true of y’, and ‘x is instantiated by y and z in that order’ 
says the same thing as ‘x is true of y and z in that order’, and so on. It follows that ‘x holds of y’ says the same 
thing as ‘x is true of y’, and ‘x holds of y and z in that order’ says the same thing as ‘x is true of y and z in that 
order’, and so on. This makes it plausible, if wasn’t already, that ‘x holds’ says the same thing as ‘x is true’, and 
that ‘HOLD1’ expresses the same thing as ‘TRUE’. Call this the True-of Argument. I conclude that these two 
                                                 
17 In note 6, I mentioned some weaker variants of the essentialist claims made in this paper. Those who prefer the weak-
er variants will want to replace M with M*: ⃞∀x(⃞x, truth(TRUE(x) if and only if φ) if and only if ⃞x, holding1(HOLD1(x) if 
and only if φ)).   
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predicates express the same relation. Together with ID and with our results about ‘g0’ and ‘p0’, this 
conclusion entails that f10=f12.  
 
11. The full picture 
The proposition that Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander is such that, as a matter of metaphysical necessity, 
it is true if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander. That fact about p0, viz., 
 f13 [⃞(TRUE(p0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander)] 
is fully grounded in a fact about the truth essence p0, namely, f12 above. And f12=f10, which is a fact about 
the holding essence of a certain 0-adic relation. So the grounds of f12 are those of f10. This gives us the 
grounding structure depicted in Figure 4: 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I want to draw one further conclusion from the claims represented in the diagram. Repeated application of 
the transitivity of grounding18 to the structure above yields the result that  
 GP4 f13 ← f11, f9, f7, f6   
In other words, f13, the ‘canonical’ fact about the truth conditions of p0, is fully grounded in three plugging 
facts together with a fact about the holding essence of the fully unsaturated relation g3. It is plausible that a 
                                                 
18 ∀x∀yy∀zz∀ww if (x ← yy & z is one of yy & z ← ww) then ∃uu∀u((u is one of uu iff u is one of ww or (u is one of yy & u 
is not identical to z)) and x ← uu). 
⃞(TRUE(p0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander) 
 
f13 
⃞g0(HOLD1(g0) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus to Alexander) 
 
f10 
 
 PLUG1(g1, Alexander, g0) ⃞g1∀x1(HOLD3(g1, x1) if and only if Philip gave Bucephalus  to x1) f8 f11 
⃞g2∀x1∀x2(HOLD2(g2, x1, x2) if and only if Philip gave x1 to x2) f5 PLUG1(g2, Bucephalus, g1) f9 
 
PLUG1(g3, Philip, g2) 
 
⃞g3∀x1∀x2∀x3(HOLD4(g3, x1, x2, x3) if and only if x1 gave x2 to x3) 
 
f6 f7 
Figure 4 
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parallel grounding explanation can be given of the canonical fact about the truth conditions of any atomic 
proposition.19   
 
13. Conclusion 
I have given an account of what grounds the facts about the truth conditions of atomic Russellian proposi-
tions. Those facts are grounded by facts about the truth essences of the given propositions. And those latter 
facts are, in turn, grounded by facts about how the propositions (0-adic relations) are built up by plugging 
objects into slots in non-0-adic relations, together with facts about the holding essences of the relevant non-
0-adic relations.20 As to the facts for which I have not specified any ground — e.g., f11, f9, f7, f6 — I do not 
claim that those facts are fundamental. My view is that the ‘plugging’ facts, f11, f9, and f7, are not fundamen-
tal, but rather are grounded in mereological facts, in a way that is constrained by my mereological definition 
of the plug1 relation and my account of the parts of propositions. On the other hand, the most basic holding 
essence fact, f6, is plausibly fundamental, at least if the gave relation is simple and has no real definition (on 
which see Rosen (2015)). Lastly: I hope that my account can be extended in a natural way to non-atomic 
propositions, but that’s a big topic, and I can’t do it justice here.21 
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